The Jury as a Source of Reasonable Search and Seizure Law by Bacigal, Ronald J.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications School of Law
1980
The Jury as a Source of Reasonable Search and
Seizure Law
Ronald J. Bacigal
University of Richmond, rbacigal@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Fourth Amendment Commons, and the Legal History Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ronald J. Bacigal, The Jury as a Source of Reasonable Search and Seizure Law, 1980 BYU L. Rev. 1739.
The Jury as a Source of Reasonable Search and 
Seizure Law 
Ronald J. Bacigal* 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The definition of a reasonable search has bedeviled the 
United States Supreme Court for some ninety years.2 Formal 
logic or legal reasoning assists the Court in tracing premise to 
conclusion, but does not alone suggest the initial premise. The 
Court's difficulty in fourth amendment cases, in general, lies in 
identifying the premise-the fundamental value which is em-
bodied in this constitutional guarantee.3 The Court has recog-
nized that this funda.lnental value, whatever it is, has an origin 
outside the language of the amendment,4 and the Court has con-
sidered sources such as history,G popular consensus,8 natural 
.* Professor of Law, University of Richmond. Formerly Executive Director, Virginia 
Task Force on Criminal Justice. Fulbright Scholar, International Law, The Hague. 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
2. The Court did not consider an important fourth amendment question until Boyd 
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). A sizeable body of fourth amendment precedent 
did not develop until the advent of prohibition in the 1920'a. 
3. The Supreme Court has devoted a great deal of attention to the procedural re-
quirements of the fourth amendment. See, e.g., the Court's examination of when a war-
rant must be obtained, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433 (1971), and the two 
prongs of Aquilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). Although these procedural considera· 
tions are an important part of the fourth amendment jurisprudence, this Article focuses 
on what I regard as the substantive aspect of the amendment - the substantive justifi· 
cation, whether it be analyzed in terms of probable cause or reasonableness. which must 
be established in order to render the search constitutional. See text accompanying note 
39 infra. 
4. See Rekas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978). 
5. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 
294, 312-18 (1959). 
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law,7 and utilitarian balancing8 to find this origin. None of these, 
however, provides an adequate basis for answering the variety 
and complexity of fourth amendment issues that confront the 
Court. 
A. History 
History reveals little more than that the drafters of the 
fourth amendment's reasonable search requirement were prima-
rily concerned with remedying two then-existing abuses: writs of 
assistance and general warrants.9 History neither clearly defines 
a reasonable search nor fully reveals the fundamental values un-
derlying that requirement. Therefore, in using historical analysis 
to apply the fourth amendment's reasonable search test to mod-
ern police practices, the Court encounters the classic problem of 
defining both the historical core and the modern penumbra! cov-
erage of the amendment:10 Should the Court adopt the view that 
the fundamental core of the amendment is the prohibition of 
writs of assistance and general warrants, and that only those 
modern practices that are sufficiently similar to these histori-
cally prohibited processes fall within the penumbra of the 
amendment's coverage, or should the Court regard writs of assis-
tance and general warrants merely as examples of the funda-
mental evil. that the amendment sought to prohibit, 11 recogniz-
ing that modern police practice may, after all, possess few of the 
characteristics of a general warrant but still violate the spirit of 
6. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12. 
7. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 312 (1967)(Douglas, J., dissenting). See 
generally Doss & Doss, On Morals, Privacy, and the Constitution, 25 U. MIAMI L. REv. 
395 (1971). 
8. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 
(1967). 
9. See J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966); T. TAY· 
LOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL hmmPRETATION (1969); Lesson, The History and 
Development of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 55 JOHNS HOPKINS U. 
STUD. HisT. & PoL. Sci. (1937). 
10. See generally Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 
HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor 
Hart, 71 HARv. L. REv. 630 (1958). 
11. Compare the approach suggested by Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)(extending fourth amendment protections to in-
tangibles under the premise that the amendment is intended to benefit people, not 
things or places) with that offered by Justice Black in the same case (suggesting that tho 
fourth amendment protects privacy only to the extent it prohibits unreasonable searches 
and seizures of "persons, houses, papers, and effects" but does not extend to intangibles). 
Id. at 364 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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the fourth amendment? 
Regardless of whether emphasis is placed on the amend-
ment's core meaning or on it.a penumbral coverage, the Court is 
still left with the task of defining the amendment's fundamental 
purpose. It is true that inquiry into fundamental purpose could 
be avoided if the Court were to rigidly define the amendment as 
an attempt to specifically prohibit the issuance of a general war-
r~t or a writ of assistance, but such a rigid approach would re-
duce the fourth amendment to an historical curiosity like the 
third amendment, 12 or like a statute prohibiting the tying of a 
horse to a street sign. Although the fourth amendment, if so 
construed, would be handy to have around in the event writ.a of 
assistance reappear in our society, it would have no other prac-
tical significance. Fortunately, the present Court displays no 
readiness to adopt such an unrealistically rigid view of the 
amendment.13 
Because it is a constitution and not a statute with which the 
Court is concerned, the language of the amendment must be 
given some breadth beyond those particular forms of evil that 
the drafters suffered at the hands of English customs inspec-
tors.14 Besides giving due deference to the historical core of the 
amendment, the Court must extend the amendment's coverage 
to those modem practices that are "sufficiently similar" to gen-
eral warrant.a and writ.a of assistance. Yet determining what is 
sufficiently similar raises a question about the fundamental pur-
pose of the amendment: Does the modern practice under scru-
tiny seek to accomplish the same basic evil that a general war-
rant accomplishes and thus fall within the prohibition of the 
fourth amendment? 
Unfortunately, the framers' prohibition of writs of assis-
tance and general warrant.a does not clearly indicate what that 
fundamental purpose was. Important questions remain unan-
swered: Did the framers condemn general warrant.a in an effort 
to preserve individual privacy, or did they simply seek to elimi-
nate the arbitrary exercise of power by the police? If both pur-
12. "No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, without the con-
sent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." U.S. 
CONST. amend. Ill. 
13. Such a rigid view taken by an earlier Court, however, provided a foundation for 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), which was overruled in Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
14. Writs of Assistance were utilized by customs inspectors attempting to enforce 
the Navigation Acts. See authorities cited in note 9 supra. 
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poses were involved in the prohibition, how is the Court to deal 
with cases where the separate purposes lead to opposite re-
sults?111 Even if the Court could clearly ascertain the framers' 
general purpose, there would not be clear answers for many of 
the modern predicaments faced by today's society. The constitu-
tional framers could not have foreseen the threat to privacy 
posed by technological advances such as miniature microphone-
transmitters and other modern methods of electronic surveil-
lance.16 Nor could the drafters have foreseen the increased dan-
gers of modern crime such as the perils of explosives in airplanes 
and widespread drug use in urban societies.17 The Court simply 
will not find clear answers to the fourth amendment problems 
arising in a modern context by searching history for the framers' 
general purpose. 
B. Popular Consensus 
One way the Court can avoid a static historical view of the 
fourth amendment is to interpret it to reflect the current 
"shared understandings" of society.18 In fact the Court often 
speaks of the "reasonableness" of a search as a matter of com-
mon sense for prudent laymen, rather than a technical question 
for lawyers.19 There are empirical problems with such an ap-
proach, however, principle among which is that in our pluralistic 
society, the ideal "shared understandings" may not exist. Since 
most police investigations focus on a subculture of criminals, 
suspected criminals, and those who lead an unconventional or 
deviant life style, the average, prudent layman, who is to re-
present the standard of reasonableness, has no experience with 
15. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 
368-69 (1974). 
16. See generally A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND Flu:EnoM (1967). 
17. "[C]rimes, unspeakable horrid crimes, are with us in this country, and we cannot 
afford to dispense with any known method of detecting and correcting them unless It is 
forbidden by the Constitution ••.• "Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 73 (1967)(Black, 
J., dissenting). H these be "hard times" in which we live, it may be wise to realize that 
the times often appear uniquely difficult to those who live them. Some 300 years ago 
Lord Hale authorized search warrants on the ground of "necessity especially in these 
times, where felonies and robberies are so frequent." J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
AND THE SUPREME COURT 26-27 (1966). 
18. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 173 n.12 (1978); Kitch, Katz v. United States: 
The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968 SUP. CT. REV. 133, 137. 
19. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959)(quoting Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). 
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searches and seizures.20 Even those few searches that touch a 
large number of citizens (e.g., the weapons detection devices at 
airports) are not likely to evoke a clear consensus.21 The Consti-
tution, Justice Holmes observed, "is made for people of funda-
mentally differing views. "22 
In those instances where a popular consensus may exist, 
there remains the important question of whether Supreme Court 
Justices are the ones to identify and define it. Justices Brennan 
and Marshall once read popular consensus as prohibiting the 
death penalty,23 yet popularly elected state legislatures coun-
tered by enacting new death penalty statutes.2 ' 
If the Court is not merely to read the popular consensus 
(and risk a misreading) but also to launder or filter consensus to 
free it of emotionalism or prejudice,2 1:1 it must look beyond ex-
isting consensus to some independent standard that distin-
guishes emotional agreement from an enlightened, "true" con-
sensus. The empirical difficulties involved are not only 
substantial but are arguably beyond the capabilities of any 
court. 
Even if a true consensus could be found, it is not clear what 
weight it should be assigned in defining the reasonableness stan-
dard for searches and seizures. The most fundamental objection 
to interpreting the fourth amendment according to popular con-
sensus is that such an approach conflicts with the role of the 
Constitution as a safeguard against the potential tyranny of the 
popular majority. When interpreting ambiguous language in a 
statute, a court may justifiably "stand in" for the legislature and 
apply the perceived will of the people. But when the Supreme 
Court interprets the Constitution to invalidate a statute author-
izing unreasonable searches,26 the Court sets itself against the 
20. See K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 18-19 (1975). 
21. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), where the Justices 
disagreed as to the likely response from citizens who are asked to authorize an "inspec-
tion" of their dwelling by health officials. 
22. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905)(Holmes, J., dissenting). 
23. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 299-300 (1972)(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 
332-33 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
24. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-81 (1976). 
25. See R. DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 126 (1977); Wellington, Common 
Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE 
L.J. 221, 251 (1973). 
26. E.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967)(striking down the New York wire-
tap law). 
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will of the people as expressed by the legislature. 27 The Court 
cannot employ the majority consensus as a vehicle for protecting 
individuals from the dictates of that same majority.28 
I do not mean to totally discount the role of consensus in 
formulating law. The theme of this symposium is the relation-
ship between the legal and moral orders in society. I agree that 
there is an important interaction between the legal order and 
existing customs, mores, and popular consensus in society, and I 
will later return to that theme. The point to be made here is 
that such interaction is properly subtle and long range; the 
Court cannot invoke clear consensus as a definitive resolution of 
particular cases. 
C. Natural Law 
The Court can justifiably disregard popular consensus by 
determining the reasonableness of a search according to a natu-
ral law standard of fundamental rights embodied in the fourth 
amendment. Such rights are seen as eternal and immutable;211 
thus, the reasonableness of a search can be seen as a discover-
able absolute that is not contingent upon current consensus or 
historical data. Whatever appeal lies in the concept of an abso-
lute or "right" answer, it involves an obvious problem of select-
ing a methodology for discovering that answer. so Legal philoso-
phers, political philosophers, moral philosophers, and others all 
offer the Court theories pointing to numerous versions of the 
right answer.81 Understandably, the Supreme Court has been 
wary of translating any of the various concepts of natural law 
into specific decisions. 
At one point the Court appeared to move toward a concept 
of privacy-"the right most valued by civilized men"82-as the 
fundamental right embodied in the fourth amendment. Al-
27. Legislatures are often criticized as unrepresentative bodies that merely react to 
various pressure groups. See, e.g., T. Lowt, THE END OF LmERALISM (1969). Whatever the 
deficiencies of legislative bodies, the coUrts cannot objectively claim to be more represen· 
tative of popular consensus. 
28. Ely, On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 52 (1978). 
29. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 
HARv. L. REv. 149, 152 (1928). 
30. See Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57 TEx. L. REv. 1361, 1376 (1979). 
31. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, 
STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
32. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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though the origin58 and· definition34 of the right of privacy were 
clouded, the Court seemed to recognize certain forms of privacy 
as absolute or nearly absolute rights.8 G However, at least within 
the context of the fourth amendment, the Court appears to have 
rejected the concept of the right of privacy as absolute. 88 The 
Court appears to have given up on discovering any absolutely 
protected zones of privacy and has confined its analysis of the 
fourth amendment to a balancing of a privacy interest (not a 
nght) against the societal interest in law enforcement. 
D. A Balancing Approach 
The Court's utilitarian balancing of interests has come to 
dominate all aspects of fourth amendment jurisprudence. Tradi-
tionally, the major issues of fourth amendment litigation have 
been seen as falling into four distinct categories: (1) the scope of 
the amendment-the description of those circumstances merit-
ing the amendment's protections, compared with those situa-
tions in which the amendment is totally inapplicable;87 (2) the 
standards of the amendment-determination of what factors 
make a search constitutionally reasonable or unreasonable;" (3) 
the consequences of fourth amendment violations-the determi-
nation of when the exclusionary rule applies;89 and (4) the exis-
tence of standing to raise fourth amendment questions-the 
identification of the class entitled to invoke the amendment's 
protections.40 
33. See Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MlcH. L. REV. 219 
(1965). 
34. See Parker, Definition of Privacy, 'J:1 RtrrGRRS L. REv. '1:75 (1974). 
35. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)(mother's right to terminate preg-
nancy in certain situations); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965)(penwn-
bral right to marital privacy). 
36. See Andreasen v. Maryland, 4'1:7 U.S. 463 (1976). 
37. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See generally Moylan, The 
Fourth Amendment Inapplicable vs. the Fourth Amendment Sat~fied: The Neglected 
Threshold of "So What?'', 1977 S. ILL. L.J. 75. 
38. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). See generally Bacigal, The 
Fourth Amendment in Flu:i:: The Rise and Fall of Probable Cause, 1980 ILL. L.F. 763. 
39. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). See generally Schrock 
& Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 
59 MINN. L. REv. 251 (1974). 
40. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S. Ct. 2556 (1980); United States v. 
Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). See generally 
Knox, Some Thoughts on the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and Standing to Chal-
lenge Searches and Seizures, 40 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1975). 
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At least since the Court decided Katz v. United States41 in 
1967, the ongoing, distinct nature of those four categories has 
been in grave doubt. Prior to Katz the amendment's scope was 
defined to cover a physical trespass into a constitutionally pro-
tected area."2 The Katz Court was clear in overturning this stan-
dard but offered in its stead only a nebulous new standard of 
protecting those "expectation[s of privacy] that society is pre-
pared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "43 Although the Court appar-
ently assumes that it is the appropriate and exclusive decision-
maker in this area, it has never articulated the methodology it 
employs to determine reasonable expectations of privacy. Justice 
Harlan unabashedly proposed that the "impact on the individ-
ual's sense of security [be] balanced against the utility of the 
[government's] conduct as a technique of law enforcement.""" 
The Court, however, has not openly adopted Justice Harlan's 
balancing approach. It has instead frequently avoided a determi-
nation of the amendment's scope by subsuming the scope in-
quiry within the question of fourth amendment standards where 
the balancing approach is more apparent."11 
In determining the standards for a constitutional search, the 
Justices have engaged in a long-standing controversy over the 
relationship of the fourth amendment's two conjunctive clauses: 
the reasonableness clause and the warrant clause. 48 The Court's 
fourth amendment analysis originally focused on the warrant 
clause's requirement of probable cause as the substantive justifi-
cation for a constitutional search. Probable cause was often re-
ferred to as an absolute standard that applied uniformly when-
ever the amendment applied;n However, the Court subsequently 
placed increased emphasis on reasonableness as the substantive 
requirement for a constitutional search."8 Unlike the compara-
, 
41. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
42. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928). 
43. 389 U.S. at 361 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
44. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971)(Harlan, J., dissenting). 
45. The Court has also avoided the scope question by creating an irregular version 
of the assumption of risk concept. See generally Bacigal, Some Observations and Pro· 
posals on the Nature of the Fourth Amendment, 46 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 529, 537 (1978). 
46. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). For a history of the 
controversy, see Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great 
"Search Incident" Geography Battle, 26 MERCER L. REv. 1047 (1975). 
47. See Bacigal, The Fourth Amendment in Flux: The Rise and Fall of Probable 
Cause, 1980 ILL. L.F. 763. 
48. Compare United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) with Trupiano v. 
United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948). 
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tively rigid definition of probable cause, reasonableness was to 
be determined from "the total atmosphere of the case."49 Al-
though reasonableness as a flexible standard and probable cause 
as a comparatively rigid and uniform standard originally repre-
sented very distinct views of the fourth amendment, the distinc-
tiveness was afterwards lost with the Court's de facto recogni-
tion of a sliding scale of probable cause, which served to infuse 
the warrant clause with the flexibility that had previously been 
unique to the reasonableness clause. 
In Camara v. Municipal Court150 and Terry v. Ohio, 111 the 
Court abandoned all pretense that probable cause was a fixed 
and uniform standard deduced from virtually absolute principles 
enshrined in the Constitution. It instead adopted the view that 
the probable cause standard is a compromise for accommodating 
the opposing interests of the government and individual citizens, 
and recognized that the same compromise is not required in all 
situations. The standard of the amendment, whether it be spo-
ken of in terms of reasonableness or probable cause,112 was thus 
to be determined by balancing conflicting individual and govern-
mental interests. The flexibility of this balancing approach to 
fourth amendment standards has subsumed the threshold ques-
tion of the amendment's scope. The Court eschews rigorous 
analysis of the amendment's scope in order to reach the question 
of fourth amendment standards where it may engage in its new-
found freedom to weigh and balance any number of relevant fac-
tors.113 In practice, the Court's references to the amendment's 
49. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). 
50. 387 U.S. 523 (1967): 
51. 392 U.S. 1 (1967). 
52. In place of a rigid definition ·of probable cause as a "reasonable belief," the 
Court uses such terms as "reasonable suspicion," United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 
U.S. 873, 882 (1975), and "clear indication," Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 
(1966). Lower courts have referred to the required form of probable cause as "real suspi· 
cion," Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967); some knowledge, 
Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1956); "mere possibility," People v. 
Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 739, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385, 404, 497 P.2d 1121, 1140 (1972); reasona-
ble, non-whimsical suspicion, People v. DeBaur, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 352 N.E.2d 562, 570, 386 
N.Y.S.2d 375, 383 (1976). Of course the important constitutional consideration is the 
distinction between mere suspicion and reasonable suspicion, or between mere belief and 
reasonable belief. The concept of reasonableness is the significant legal determination; 
references to belief, suspicion and justification are surplus.age. 
53. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), where only two 
members of the majority addressed the issue of whether a seizure had taken pl.nee. The 
three concurring Justices were willing to assume that a seizure had occurred and con· 
fined their analysis to whether the standard of reasonable suspicion had been met. See 
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scope and standards are merely alternative expressions of a sin-
gle determination: The standard of the amendment is met be-
cause the government interest is deemed sufficient to set aside 
privacy; or, in the terminology of the scope inquiry, the privacy 
interest is deemed insufficient to trigger fourth amendment 
protection. 
Adoption of this flexible balancing approach merges not 
only the questions of the scope and standards of the fourth 
amendment, but also the previously distinct categories of stand-
ing to invoke the amendment's protections and the application 
of the exclusionary rule. Prior to Rakas v. Illinois, M the Court 
had formulated rules of standing that were not necessarily tied 
to expectations of privacy and the balancing approach.1111 In 
Rakas, however, Justice Rehnquist indicated that the Katz ex-
pectation of privacy formulation should be the sole criterion for 
determining standing to invoke fourth amendment protections.110 
During its 1979 term, a majority of the Court adopted Justice 
Rehnquist's view that the traditional standing inquiry was to be 
subsumed within the scope question of whether the search in-
fringed upon an interest of the defendant which the amendment 
was designed to protect.117 Thus, the question of fourth amend-
ment standing was subsumed within the question of the amend-
ment's scope, which in turn has been subsumed within the ques-
tion of reasonable standards. 
Justice White, dissenting in Rakas, argued that the majority 
had undercut the substantive protection of the fourth amend-
ment because of its desire to reduce the operation of the amend-
ment's exclusionary rule.118 In fact, the Court's approach to the 
exclusionary rule is but another aspect of the balancing ap-
proach which has come to dominate all fourth amendment con-
siderations. Whatever the original basis of the amendment's ex-
clusionary rule,'59 the present Court regards the rule as "a 
also Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971). 
54. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
55. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). See generally The Su-
preme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARv. L. REv. 62, 171-80 (1979). 
56. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 134. 
57. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S. Ct. 2556 (1980); United States v. Salvucci, 100 
S.Ct. 2547 (1980). 
58. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 168-69 (White, J., dissenting). 
59. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court referred to deterrence, judicial 
integrity, and the intimate relationship between the fourth and fifth amendments. See 
· generally Schrock & Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitu-
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judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amend-
ment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a 
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved. "80 Thus, 
when not clearly bound by precedent,81 the Court views itself as 
free to apply or not to apply the exclusionary rule depending 
upon the results of balancing the benefits of deterrence against 
the costs of excluding relevant and trustworthy evidence.82 
There is little sense in maintaining the traditionally distinct 
fourth amendment concepts of scope, standards, standing, and 
consequences when the Court resolves all of these issues by re-
sort to the single method of flexible case by case balancing of 
individual and governmental interests.83 Taken to its logical end, 
this balancing approach reduces all fourth amendment inquiries 
to two related fundamental questions: (1) How much and what 
type of privacy does a reasonably free society require? and (2) 
how much and what type of intrusion upon privacy is required 
to further a reasonably ordered society?s.c Although such ques-
tions may seem unduly abstract, they are appropriate considera-
tions when determining the first premise-the fundamental 
value-embodied in the fourth amendment. I do not propose an 
answer to these questions, but merely suggest a process wherein 
tional Requirement, 59 MmN. L. R.Ev. 251, 263-70 (1974); Note, Formalum, Legal Real-
ism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendment, 
90 HARV. L. R.Ev. 945 (1977). 
60. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). 
61. The Chief Justice appears willing to overturn Mapp if certain conditions are 
met. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 
388, 420-21 (1971)(Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
62. See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 633-34 (1980)(Brennan, J., dis-
senting); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976). Cf. Mincy v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 
397-98 (1978)(in fifth amendment cases the Court distinguishes between the exclusion of 
unreliable evidence and the exclusion of trustworthy evidence for the extrinsic purpose 
of deterring police "misconduct"). 
63. One commentator suggests that the Court bas abandoned all attempts at princi-
pled analysis of the fourth amendment in favor of resolving individual cases according to 
the "fundamental fairness" approach of Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
Yackle, The Burger Court and the Fourth Amendment, 26 KAN. L. R.Ev. 335, 427 (1978). 
64. The issues raised under the fourth amendment "bring into sharp focus the clas-
sic dilemma of order vs. liberty in the democratic state." J. LANDYNSKJ, SiwtcH AND 
SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME CoURT 13 (1966). The fourth amendment is not unique in 
posing such fundamental questions. All public law issues are in a way reducible to a 
balancing of individual and governmental interests for the good of society. See, e.g., Jus-
tice Jackson's description of the Bill of Rights as "the maximum restrictions upon the 
power of organized society over the individual that are compatible with the maintenance 
of organized society itself." Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 61 (1949)(Jackson, J., concur· 
ring in part, dissenting in part). 
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the Court, the jury, and administrative officials all have a role in 
addressing the issues. 
II. THE PROPOSED PROCESS 
A. The Court's Role 
Marbury v. Madison6 rs and the concept of judicial review of 
legislative enactments is familiar to most laymen. Less familiar, 
however, is the establishment of the judiciary's supremacy over 
the jury in interpreting law. Determination of law by jury00 was 
a widespread practice in this country until the 1850's07 and was 
not eliminated in the federal courts until Spart v. United 
States68 in 1895. It is thus helpful to examine the holding of 
Spart and the role the judiciary envisioned for itself. 
The Spart Court's recognition of judicial supremacy is 
based on the same premise as that described in Marbury v. 
Madison-"that it is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is."69 In rejecting a role 
for Maryland juries70 in the resolution of search and seizure is-
sues, Judge Charles E. Moylan, Jr., the noted fourth amendment 
scholar, asserted: "In a criminal case, the only issue for the jury 
is that of guilt or innocence. Anything that does not bear upon 
guilt or innocence is utterly foreign to the only task assigned to 
the jury."71 In typically colorful fashion, Judge Moylan further 
65. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
66. Jury determination of law is here used to refer to the practice of submitting 
questions of law to the jury. Authorizing the jury to determine law must be distinguished 
from the jury's extralegal power to nullify law. Jury nullification power exists because 
general verdicts of acquittal are not subject to review by the judiciary. See generally 
Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 168 (1972). 
67. See Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARv. L. REV. 582 (1939); 
Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170 
(1964). 
68. 156 U.S. 51 (1895). 
69. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. 
70. Maryland has retained the colonial practice of recognizing the jury as "the 
Judges of Law, as well as of fact." Mn. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 23 (formerly 
art. XV, § 5). See generally Dennis, Maryland's Antique Constitutional Thorn, 92 U. 
PA. L. REv. 34 (1943); Henderson, The Jury as Judges of Law and Fact in Maryland, 52 
Mn. ST. B.A. 184 (1947); Markell, Trial by Jury - A Two Horse Team or One Horse 
Team?, 42 Mn. ST. B.A. 72 (1937); Prescott, Juries as Judges of the Law: Should the 
Practice Be Continued?, 60 Mn. ST. B.A. 246 (1955). 
71. Ehrlich v. State, 42 Md. App. 730, 403 A.2d 371, 376 (1979). Without any discus-
sion of the issue, the United States Supreme Court decreed that in the federal system 
the reasonableness of a search and seizure is "a question of fact and law for the court 
and not for the jury." Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 505, 511 (1925). 
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stated that "[t]he jury is assigned the sole mission of determin-
ing 'Whodunnit?' ''72 From this premise Judge Moylan reasoned 
that because the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule serves 
the extrinsic purpose of deterring police misconduct and does 
not enhance the fact-finding process, "[i]t is not the function of 
the jury 'to police the police' by denying itself probative evi-
dence."73 The internal structure of such a syllogism cannot be 
faulted, but the premise is open to challenge. 
The Constitution's framers did not perceive the sole mission 
of the jury as determining "whodunnit.m• The prevailing view at 
the time of the adoption of the Constitution and throughout the 
first third of the nineteenth century saw the jury as a mainstay 
of liberty and an integral part of democratic government. 7~ The 
common man in the jury box, just as the citizen in the voting 
booth, was seen as a central ingredient of a democratic theory 
that asserted the sovereignty of the people through self-govem-
ment.76 Throughout our country's history the jury's exercise of 
nullification power has been the most dramatic method of re-
jecting the limited role of determining "whodunnit." The acquit-
tal rates for prosecutions under the Fugitive Slave Act77 and 
Prohibition Laws78 demonstrate juries' desire to expand their 
reach beyond factual questions and to address the law itself.79 
Even in the absence of dramatic political or moral issues the 
modem day jury occasionally "acquits the defendant in protest 
72. Erlich v. State, 42 Md. App. 730, 403 A.2d 371, 377 (1979). Judge Moylan's view 
of the jury's limited function as a factfinder is widely shared by the judiciary. See, e.g., 
United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 1973). 
73. Erlich v. State, 42 Md. App. 730, 403 A.2d 371, 377 (1979). 
74. John Adams stated the democratic principle that "the common people ..• 
should have as complete a control, as decisive a negative, in every judgment of a court of 
judicature" as they have with regard to other decisions of government. 2 Tim WoRKB or 
JOHN ADAMS 253 (1850). 
75. See Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE 
L.J. 170 (1964). The Articles of Impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase in 1895 include 
Justice Chase's denial of the jury's right to rule OD the admissibility or evidence, and his 
refusal to allow counsel to argue to the jury that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional 
REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF THE HoN. SAHUEL CHASE (C. Evans, rptr., Baltimore 1805). See 
generally Lillich, The Chase Impeachment, 4 AIL J. or LEGAL HlsT. 49, 58 (1960). 
76. "Were I called upon to decide, whether the people had best be omitted in the 
legislative or judiciary department, I would say it is better to leave them out of the 
legislative. The execution of the laws is more important than the making of them." 3 
Worucs OF THow.s JEFFERSON 81, 82 (Wash. ed. 1854). 
77. Fugitive Slave Act, ch. 40, 12 Stat. 354 (1862). 
78. National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919)(repealed 1935). 
79. See L. F'RIEDMAN, Tim WIBE MINORITY 28-60 (1971); H. KAI.VEN & H. ZE1sEL, 
THE AMERICAN JURY 291-92 {1966). 
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against a police or prosecution practice that it considers 
improper. "80 
The continued use of general verdicts indicates that the ju-
diciary itself is not totally committed to the premise that the 
jury exists only to determine "whodunnit." If the jury's only 
function is to resolve factual disputes, it should be instructed to 
return only special findings of fact, and the trial judge should 
direct verdicts of guilty whenever reasonable jurors could not 
disagree on the facts.81 The judiciary's refusal to review general 
verdicts of acquittal evidences acceptance of a function for the 
jury beyond resolution of factual disputes. In Duncan v. Louisi· 
ana82 the Supreme Court recognized that the framers of the 
Constitution regarded the jury as "an inestimable safeguard 
against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the 
compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. "83 The concept of the jury 
as a check upon government power is more consistent with dem-
ocratic theory8" and the intent of the framers than is the view 
that the jury exists only to determine "whodunnit." The jury's 
ability to check government power is obviously enhanced when 
the jury is invested with the authority to determine law as well 
as to resolve factual questions. 
80. H. KAI.VEN & H. ZElsEL, THE AldmucAN JURY 319 (1966). 
81. See United States v. Garaway, 425 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1970)(directed verdict of 
guilty improper even where no issues of fact are in dispute). See also United States v. 
Davis, 413 F.2d 148, 153 (4th Cir. 1969); Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105-06 
(1895). 
82. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
83. Id. at 156. 
84. [I]n a representative government, there is no absurdity or contradiction, 
nor any arraying of the people against themselves, in requiring that the stat-
utes or enactments of the government shall pass the ordeal of any number of 
separate tribunals, before it shall be determined that they are to have the force 
of laws. Our American constitutions have provided five of these separate tribu-
nals, to wit, representatives, senate, executive, jury, and judges; and have made 
it necessary that each enactment shall pass the ordeal of all these separate 
tribunals, before its authority can be established by the punishment of those 
who choose to transgress it. And there is no more absurdity or inconsistency in 
making a jury one of these several tribunals, than there is in making the repre-
sentatives, or the senate, or the executive, or the judges, one of them. There is 
no more absurdity in giving a jury a veto upon the laws, than there is in giving 
a veto to each of these other tribunals. The people are no more arrayed against 
themselves, when a jury puts its veto upon a statute, which the other tribunals 
have sanctioned, than they are when the same veto is exercised by the repre· 
sentatives, the senate, the executive, or the judges. 
SPOONER, AN EssAY ON TRIAL BY JURY 11-12 (republished 1st ed. 1971)(1st ed. 1852). 
That the determination of a reasol;Ulble search is a matter of constitutional law, not legis-
lative law, does not definitively prohibit jury participation in the determination. 
739] SEARCH AND SEIZURE 753 
The troublesome aspect of the jury's determination of law is 
not the role of the jury vis-a-vis the judge, but the potential con-
flict of such a role with the individual defendant's constitutional 
rights. The view underlying the Spar{ decision is that jury deter-
mination of law cannot be a one-way proposition. If the jury can 
overrule the judge and determine law adversely to the govern-
ment, the jury must also be allowed to overrule the judge and 
determine law adversely to the defendant.8~ Thus, although al-
lowing the jury to determine law might be seen as an acceptable 
device for checking government power in a conflict between the 
judiciary and the jury, the same device may become unaccept-
able when the rights of the individual defendant are considered. 
Justice Story once stated that the individual defendant had 
the right "to be tried according to the law of the land, the fixed 
law of the land, and not by the law as a jury may understand it, 
or choose, from wantonness or ignorance or accidental mistake, 
to interpret it."86 Of course this statement begs the question by 
presuming that the judge and not the jury decides what is the 
law of the land. The question of judicial supremacy cannot be 
resolved merely by invoking the maxim that we are a govern-
ment of laws, not a government of men.87 It is not a self-evident 
truth that we are a government of laws when judges determine 
law but become a government of men when juries determine law. 
If jury decisions constitute the rule of men because juries decide 
cases on the mere basis of "random value judgments,"88 then the 
judiciary, to provide rule of law, must lay claim to a superior 
basis of decision. 
There are those who look to the judiciary for "The Right 
85. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 101-03 (1895). The jury serves a.s a safe-
guard against oppressive prosecutions only so long a.s the jury sides with the defendant 
against the government. If the community is hostile toward the defendant or bis cause, 
the jury is more likely to side with the prosecution. See Broeder, The Fr.mction.s of the 
Jury: Facts of Fictions?, 21 U. Cm. L. REv. 386 (1954). When the community is hostile 
toward the defendant, he looks to the judge for protection against the jury. Although the 
judiciary sometimes performs no better than the jury in times of panic or emergency (see 
Rostow, The Japanese-American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945)) it is im-
portant to preserve the judiciary's role a.s a safeguard against arbitrary jury power. 
86. United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835)(No. 14,545). 
87. "Judges are men, and their decisions upon complex facts must vary a.s those of 
jurors on the same facts. Calling one determination an opinion and the other a verdict 
does not . . . make that uniform and certain which from its nature must remain variable 
and uncertain." J. FRANK, CoURTS ON TRIAL 180 (1949). See generally K. DAVIS, DJSCRE· 
TIONARY JUSTICE (1969); Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARv. L. REv. 376 
(1946). 
88. Brown, Commentary, 10 VA. J. INT'L L. 108, 111 (1969). 
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Answer,"89 but without an agreed upon methodology for discov-
ering the answer, it is more realistic to look to the judiciary for 
answers that are simply consistent and principles. Judicial con-
sistency in determining and defining law is presented as a means 
of avoiding the randomness of juries and the potentially differ-
ent treatment of similarly situated defendants. In Spar/ the ju-
diciary promised consistency and uniformity by determining law 
according to settled, fixed legal principles. Stripped of superfi-
cial references to the law as the conclusion in a formal syllogism, 
the Spart opinion identified two basic conflicts: (1) The defen-
dant's right to uniformity and consistency in the law weighed 
against the utility of the jury's determination of law as a device 
for checking judicial power, and (2) the jury's uneven and une-
qual administration of justice versus "the orderly supervision of 
public affairs by judges. 'teo The latter conflict is in part the age-
old conflict of law and equity, and law again emerged victorious 
in Spart. 
In light of the judiciary's apparent inability to formulate 
settled, fixed legal principles of fourth amendment law, it ap-
pears that the benefits of judicial consistency were overvalued in 
Spart. The Supreme Court's present case by case balancing ap-
proach to fourth amendment questions more closely resembles 
the flexibility expected from a jury rather than a formal, princi-
pled consistency of law. 111 A realistic look at the apparent consis-
tency of current fourth amendment decisions could, in fact, 
again tip the scales in favor of jury determination of search and 
seizure law and lead to a reversal of Spart. This Article, how-
ever, does not advocate a total shift of fourth amendment ques-
tions from the exclusive domain of judges to the exclusive do-
main of juries. It proposes, instead, in an attempt to 
accommodate the desirable aspects of uniformity and flexibility, 
89. See Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1361 (1979). 
90. Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARv. L. REv. 582, 615 (1939). See 
generally M. WEBER, LAw IN EcoNOMY AND SoCJETY (1954), suggesting that the judiciary 
and other personnel associated with the courts tend to develop a subculture of their own. 
The legal norms that emerge from this subculture derive more from the need for pre· 
dictability and administrative convenience than from a concern for equity. 
91. The Court's balancing efforts do not conform to "the disciplines analytical 
method described as 'legal reasoning,' through which judges endeavor to formulate or 
derive principles of decision that can be applied consistently and predictably." United 
States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 633 (1980)(Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally Note, 
Formalism, Legal Realism and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARv. L. REv. 945 (1977). 
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that both judge and jury be given a role in determining search 
and seizure law. 
B. The Jury's Role 
The Supreme Court clearly reneges on Sparfs promise of 
uniformity and consistency each time it determines the reasona-
bleness of a search as if it were a jury, free to assess the unique 
aspects of an individual case and to decide "justice" in that par-
ticular case without regard to general rules or principles.112 Yet at 
other times the Court seeks to inject uniformity into fourth 
amendment law by treating all similarly situated defendants 
alike. 93 That the Court is hopelessly caught between the pulls of 
uniformity and flexibility is illustrated in Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms.94 
The Court in Mimms was confronted with a police practice 
of ordering "all drivers out of their vehicle as a matter of course 
whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation. ·~11 The 
Court addressed the general practice without inquiring whether 
the individual police officer had any suspicion that the particu-
lar motorist was likely to be armed and dangerous.11e The Court 
relied upon statistical evidence which showed " 'that a signifi-
cant percentage of murders of police officers occurs when the of-
ficers are making traffic stops,' ''117 and upheld the challenged 
practice. The Court balanced this generalized governmental in-
terest in protecting police from attack by armed motorists 
against the generalized privacy interests of motorists as a class.88 
92. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombroski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), in which Justice Rehnquist 
stated: 
The Framers of the Fourth Amendment have given us only the general 
standard of 'unreasonableness' as a guide in determining whether searches and 
seizures meet the standard of that Amendment in those cases where a warrant 
is not required. Very little that has been said in our previous decisions ••• and 
very little that we might say here can usefully refine the language or the 
Amendment itself in order to evolve some detailed formula for judging cases 
such as this. 
Id. at 448. 
93. E.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuertes, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
94. 434 U.S. 106 (1977). 
95. Id. at 110. 
96. The state conceded that "the officer had no reason to suspect foul play from the 
particular driver at the time of the stop, there having been nothing unusual or suspicious 
about his behavior." Id. at 109. 
97. Id. at 110 {quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5 (1973)). 
98. In its haste to balance the de minimus privacy interest or motorists against the 
756 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1980 
In holding that all motorists must obey an order to exit their 
autos after a lawful stop, the Court attempted to treat all simi-
larly situated defendants alike. This uniformity was achieved, 
however, by sacrificing all flexibility. As Justice Stevens noted in 
dissent: 
The Court cannot seriously believe that the risk to the arrest-
ing officer is so universal that his safety is always a reasonable 
justification for ordering a driver out of his car. The commuter 
on his way home to dinner, the parent driving children to 
school, the tourist circling the Capitol, or the family on a Sun-
day afternoon outing hardly pose the same threat as a driver 
curbed after a high-speed chase through a high-crime area late 
at night. Nor is it universally true that the driver's interest in 
remaining in the car is negligible. A woman stopped at night 
may fear for her own safety; a person in poor health may object 
to standing in the cold or rain; another who left home in haste 
to drive children or spouse to school or to the train may not be 
fully dressed; an elderly driver who presents no possible threat 
of violence may regard the police command as nothing more 
than an arrogant and unnecessary display of authority. 
Whether viewed from the standpoint of the officer's interest in 
his own safety, or of the citizen's interest in not being required 
to obey an arbitrary command, it is perfectly obvious that the 
millions of traffic stops that occur every year are not fungible. 911 
Justice Stevens' preference for an "individualized inquiry 
into the particular facts justifying every police intrusion"100 is 
the ultimate in :flexibility and reflects a traditional concern for 
adjudicative facts instead of legislative facts such as the statisti-
cal evidence cited by the majority. But such an approach does 
not fully consider the institutional role of the Supreme Court. 
The Court controls its own docket and therefore possesses 
some discretion to choose the particular factual situations 
through which the law will be interpreted. The Court's prime 
institutional task is to deal with issues of significant public in-
terest, not merely to do justice to the particular parties.101 The 
weighty interest in police safety, the Court did not pause to give serious consideration to 
the "scope" question of whether the order to exit the vehicle constituted a seizure under 
the amendment. 
99. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 120-21 (1977)(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
100. Id. at 116. 
101. A court addressing a petition for discretionary review is not primarily con-
cerned with the correctness of the judgment below. Rather, "review is generally granted 
only if a case raised an issue of significant public interest or jurisprudential importance 
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fourth amendment cases in which certiorari is granted are best 
seen as vehicles for broad policy statements designed to guide 
lower courts, prosecutors, defense counsel, and, most impor-
tantly, the police.102 When the Court abandons Sparfs promise 
of determining law according to general principles in favor of 
unstructured, ad hoc balancing of the total circumstances of the 
particular case, the Court leaves us with murky law for this day 
and this case only.103 
The Court's role in dealing with broad policies and general 
rules necessarily conflicts with its role of protecting the rights of 
individual citizens.104 Justice Stevens is obviously correct in as-
serting that individual defendants do not regard themselves as 
fungible items to be manipulated for the general good of soci-
ety.105 But it is impossible for the Court to maintain its institu-
tional concern for general principles while remaining totally re-
sponsive to the peculiarities of each case. All individuals and all 
fourth amendment cases are somewhat unique, just as they all 
share certain common characteristics. As Professor Amsterdam 
has succinctly observed, 
Any number of categories, however shaped, is too few to en-
or conflicts with controlling precedent." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827 (1977). 
102. See generally Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: 
The Limits of Lawyering, 48 hm. L. J. 329 (1973). 
103. "If the number of pertinent factors of decision is too large, and each of them is 
constantly shifting, then categories of classification or criteria of analogy will be hard to 
draw and even harder to maintain." R. UNGER, LAw lN Mon&RN SOCIETY 197 (1976). 
104. See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978), and R. NOZICK, 
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974), discussing the role of the judiciary in protecting 
individual rights even when utilitarian balancing might require sacrificing those rights 
for the common good. On a less theoretical level, the actual experience in Maryland is 
relevant. See note 71 supra. Prior to amendment in 1950, the Maryland Constitution's 
recognition of the jury as the final judges of law precluded appellate review of the legal 
sufficiency of the evidence. A defendant who suffered disfavor with the jury could not 
look to the judiciary for protection even when there was an "absolute failure of legal 
evidence to justify a conviction." Markell, Trial by Jury-A Two Horse Team or One 
Horse Team?, 42 MD. ST. B.A. 72, 81 (1937). In 1950, Article XV, section 5, of the Mary-
land Constitution was amended to read: "In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall 
be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the 
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction." MD. CoNST., Declaration of Rights, 
art. 23 (Emphasis added). The Maryland experience demonstrates the importance of the 
judiciary as a safeguard against irresponsible juries. In arguing for a supplemental jury 
determination of reasonable searches, this article does not seek to diminish the role of 
the judiciary in protecting individual rights. 
105. "Without individuality, there is no function for privacy. When we become fun-
gible goods to be manipulated by government, there can be no recognition of idiosyncra-
cies, no private realms to husband against intrusion." Kurland, The Private I, U. Cm. 
MAGAZINE 7, 36 (Autumn 1976). 
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compass life and too many to organize it manageably. The 
question remains at what level of generality and in what shape 
rules should be designed in order to encompass all that can be 
encompassed without throwing organization to the wolves.108 
The conflicting benefits of uniformity and flexibility can 
best be achieved if the Court shares with the jury the determina-
tion of the reasonableness of a particular search. It is proposed 
that the judge make a preliminary ruling on the constitutionality 
of a contested search. The preliminary ruling would be final and 
unreviewable by the jury only if the search is deemed unconsti-
tutional.107 If the judge finds the search lawful and admits the 
fruits in evidence, the jury would hear all relevant evidence re-
lating to the circumstances · of the search and would be 
instructed: 
Members of the Jury, you are the final judges of the lawfulness 
of the search in this case. Whatever I tell you about the law, 
while it is intended to be helpful to you in reaching a just and 
proper verdict in the case, is not binding upon you as members 
of the jury and you may determine the law as you apprehend it 
to be in the case. You may consider the evidence produced by 
the search only if you determine that the search was reasona-
ble within the meaning of the fourth amendment. If you find 
the search to be unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment you must disregard all evidence produced by the 
search.108 
Such an instruction recognizes the jury's traditional concern for 
the "justice" of a particular case without undue regard for gen-
eral rules.109 In situations such as Mimms, the judiciary could 
continue to apply the general rule that it is reasonable for police 
to protect themselves by ordering motorists to exit their 
automobiles. But a jury would be free to consider whether it was 
reasonable to require a particular pajama-clad, elderly, invalid 
person to exit his or her auto on a cold, dark, rainy night after 
106. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 
377 (1974). 
107. Such an approach to the fourth amendment is analogous to the Mnssnchusotta 
rule governing the admission of confessions. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 378 n.8 
(1964). See generally Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 1251, 1252-56 (1965). 
108. This instruction is a modification of the Maryland instruction on tho jury's 
prerogative to determine substantive criminal law. See note 71 supra. 
109. "The jury, in the privacy of its retirement, adjusts the general rule of law to tho 
justice of the particular case." Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of a Jury, 12 J. AM. 
Jun. Soc., 166, 170 (1929). 
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committing the heinous offense of failing to signal a left turn. 
Should the jury find the police conduct unreasonable under such 
circumstances, no great harm is done to the general rule. The 
broad guidelines for police would be preserved without sacrific-
ing the privacy of all motorists to the quest for uniformity. An 
acceptable compromise would be reached between a government 
of law and a law tempered by individual justice. 
That the jury is interpreting constitutional law in determin-
ing the reasonableness of a search should not be prohibitive. The 
Court no longer purports to determine fourth amendment law 
by the mechanical and objective methodology of legal formal-
ism.110 The Court determines the reasonableness of a search by 
deciding what is a reasonable, justifiable, legitimate expectation 
of privacy in our society111 and by determining what degree of 
protection should be afforded to such expectations. The Court 
does not possess a unique ability to make such determinations. 
"The governing principle is that [such determinations] should 
be entrusted to whoever can do the job better. Is it more appro-
priate for an expert trained in the law or for twelve representa-
tives of the community?"111 
To the extent that the term reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy connotes common sense and community consensus, m it is 
suggested that the jury is best able to make such determina-
tions. The jury can be seen as fulfimng its traditional fact-find-
110. Nineteenth century legal formalism in America was exemplified by the 
view that adjudication proceeds by deduction from virtually absolute legal 
principles rooted in natural law and enshrined in both the common law and 
the Constitution. Critics of turn-of-the-century jurists have used the term for-
malism primarily in reference to the "mechanical" methods and pretensions to 
objectivity with which the old Supreme Court invoked these unchallenged 
premises in resolving legal disputes, as distinguished from the modem tech-
nique of weighing social policies and assessing all the facts and circumstances 
surrounding a particular case to determine the most just or socially desirable 
outcome. 
Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARv. L. R.Ev. 945, 948 (1977)(footnotes omitted). 
111. The Court has characterized the expectations of privacy protected by the 
fourth amendment as those expectations which are "reasonable," United States v. Dion-
isio, 410 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1973); "justifiable," United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 
(1971); and "legitimate," Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 149 (1978). 
112. z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITlm STATES 503 (1967). 
113. "Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of 
the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law 
or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 
U.S. 128, 143 n.12. (1978). See also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 
n.14 (1976); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (1967). 
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ing function by determining what expectations of privacy are 
currently held by the reasonable member of society and by 
weighing· those expectations against the community's desire or 
need for order. Thus, in defining reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy, the jury would merely describe the existing social compro-
mise and not prescribe some ideal compromise. 
The terms justifiable and legitimate expectations of privacy 
connote more than an empirical examination of what is usually 
done in the community. The terms suggest the setting of an 
ideal toward which society is to progress. Such determinations 
require value judgments, political choices, and ultimately a "so-
cial judgment" about the ideal compromise between privacy and 
order in society. 114 How such judgments are made under our re-
publican form of government is one of the most difficult ques-
tions our society faces, and a major concern of this symposium. 
Recognizing the jury's prerogative to play some part in such 
judgments is troublesome, but perhaps less so than the current 
practice of investing the judiciary with exclusive authority to 
make such judgments.1111 
In addressing the subject of rational judgments, Professor 
Langer has noted that the pursuit of any system of thought ulti-
mately leads to "the unanswerable puzzles, the paradoxes that 
always mark the limit of what a generative idea, an intellectual 
vision, will do. "116 By approaching the fourth amendment in 
terms of privacy versus order and security, the Court has 
reached an insoluble question that is capable of two or more 
equally good answers. The Court cannot resolve the issue by an 
intellectual discovery of the "correct" answer. That does not 
mean there is no value in the Court's effort. The Justices' con-
tinual debate over the conflict of privacy and order in a free so-
ciety may help sharpen the definition of ill-defined social norms 
so that they can become more readily understood, absorbed, and 
agreed to by the members of society.117 Through the subtle, 
long-range, and still dimly understood process whereby our soci-
114. See generally Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. 
L. REv. 399 (1974). For a broad perspective on defining and identifying societal values 
and the "Moral Order" in our society, see Schwartz, Moral Order and Sociology of Law: 
Trends, Problems, and Prospects, 4 ANN. REv. Soc. 577 (1978). 
115. See generally Ely, The Supreme Court 1977 Term, Foreword: On Discovering 
Fundamental Values, 92 HARv. L. REv. 5 (1978). 
116. S. LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY 11 (3d ed. 1957). 
117. See generally Bohannan, The Differing Realms of the Law, 67 AM. ANTHRO· 
POLOGIST 33-42 (1965). 
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ety defines, agrees to, and absorbs social norms, society will ulti-
mately accept or reject the Court's particular accommodations of 
privacy and order.118 However, enthusiasm for the Court's long-
run contribution to the evolution of social norms must be tem-
pered by the obvious realization that the Court is not a debating 
society that merely exhorts and persuades. The Court is an en-
tity of great immediate power, and, in the short run, numerous 
lives are affected119 by judicial perceptions of privacy and order 
which may be totally out of touch with modern society. 
Of course the Court cannot postpone all decisions until soci-
ety's final judgment is in.120 Scholars (and critics of the Court) 
can afford to take the long view, but the Court must act in the 
fact of empirical uncertainty. Even imperfect decisions enjoying 
a degree of consistency (foolish or otherwise) are preferable to 
endless discussions of the philosophical mysteries of privacy in 
an ordered society.121 The Court must and certainly will con-
tinue to act in the face of present uncertainty, just as the Jus-
tices certainly will continue a dialogue on the proper accommo-
dation of privacy and. order in society. What is proposed in this 
Article is a process for formally involving other entities in that 
dialogue, thus providing a more immediate and direct interac-
tion between the Court and other voices in society. 
The proposed model of fourth amendment decision-making 
is a three-tier process which recognizes a role for juries, courts, 
and police adrninistrators.122 The model resembles an inverted 
pyramid with the court functioning at the highest level in 
118. See S. ScHEINGOLD, THE PoLITlCS or RIGHTS (1974). 
119. "The fourth amendment is by far the most important provision of the Bill or 
Rights in terms of the volume of litigation to which it gives rise in the nation's courts." J. 
LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME CoURT 454 (1966). 
120. History may make a final judgment on the past, but there is no existing final 
judgment on the present. 
121. See Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflection& on the Supreme 
Court's Balancing Test, 76 HARv. L. RBv. 755, 761 (1963), where the author states: 
The point is that authority cannot be conceded to persons because they are 
right-the authority must preexist their right or wrong judgment and must 
survive it too-and judges decide cases by virtue of their authority, and not 
because they are any more likely to be right than other people. 
122. The general benefits of police administrative rulemaking are explored else-
where in great detail See generally K. DAVIS, PouCB DISCRETION (1975); Amsterdam, 
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Mum. L. RBv. 349 (1974); McGowan, Rule-
Making and the Police, 70 MicH. L. RBv. 659 (1975); Wright, Beyond Discretionary Jw-
tice, 81 YALE L.J. 575 (1972). Here, I merely consider the possibility or interaction be-
tween police administrators, courts, and juries when determining the reasonableness or a 
search. 
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addressing broad categories of conflict between privacy and or-
der in society. The Court's balancing approach to the fourth 
amendment is better suited to a high level of abstraction than to 
refined calculations in individual cases. In classifying police-citi-
zen encounters, one could realistically expect the Court to recog-
nize broad categories such as border stops, stop and frisk, search 
incident to arrest, and the like. On the other hand, one would 
not expect categories that distinguish between searches of 
purses, shopping bags, briefcases, or duffel bags. Obviously, 
there is no magic number of correct categories, and, therefore, 
the dividing line between categories will always remain some-
what fuzzy. However, the dividing lines between categories can 
be more easily maintained than the dividing lines between indi-
vidual fact situations; thus, the Court can better achieve the goal 
of uniformity and consistency in law. Although the categories 
must be derived from the initial premise regarding the accom-
modation of privacy and order in society, each recognized cate-
gory would constitute an intermediate premise from which prin-
cipled analysis could distill more specific rules. For the lower 
courts and police administrators, intermediate premises cut 
short the debate of first principles and avoid turning every 
fourth amendment case into a battle over ultimate moral 
truths.123 
Whatever choices the judiciary makes regarding the accom-
modation of privacy and order in society, it is another en-
tity-law enforcement agencies-which must function at the in-
termediate level of fourth amendment decision-making. Police 
agencies possess the expertise and practical experience necessary 
to refine each judicially recognized category into meaningful gui-
dance for patrolmen. The police agency's implementation of 
court decisions necessitates the formulation of law enforcement 
policy which must, to some extent, be based on the value judg-
ments and political choices not addressed by the courts when 
recognizing broad categories of reasonable searches. 124 At pre-
sent, most law enforcement policy does not emanate from the 
administrative level of the police hierarchy, but is made prima-
rily by individual patrolmen who are "the least qualified."1211 
123. See generally Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search for Intermediate 
Premises, 80 HARv. L. REv. 986 (1967). 
124. See generally K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1975). 
125. Id. at 165. See also A.B.A. SPECIAL CoMMITrEE ON STANDARDS FOR THE ADMJNIS· 
TRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE URBAN POLICE FuNCTION 125 (1973); NATIONAL ADVI• 
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Such policy is an amalgamation of past practices, vague rules of 
thumb, racial and cultural stereotyping, and a great deal of off-
hand guesswork about what the public really wants.128 Police 
policy decisions are rarely accorded formal status as a legitimate 
part of fourth amendment decision-making, 121 and existing poli-
cies together with the underlying value choices are deliberately 
kept vague and secret to avoid scrutiny and criticism.128 Formal 
recognition that administrative policy formulation is a proper 
part of fourth amendment decision-making would insure that 
the police hierarchy, the courts, and the public become involved 
in the process of formulating policy regarding reasonable 
searches. 
At the lowest level of particularized fourth amendment de-
cision-making, the jury would fulfill its traditional function of 
applying general principles and guidelines to the facts of the 
specific case. The jury would be free to consider the types of 
detailed factual situations that could never be included in broad 
judicial categories or general administrative rules. The process of 
classification necessarily focuses on certain common characteris-
tics while ignoring the unique aspects of particular situations. 
The jury would put back into the decision-making process the 
particularized factual situations that were necessarily ignored in 
abstracting the common characteristics for a judicial category or 
administrative rule. In addition, by focusing on justice in indi-
vidual cases, the jury would be reopening the dialogue over first 
principles regarding privacy and order in society, 1211 a dialogue 
which the Court and administrative officials had to cut short in 
the interests of providing some uniformity and consistency in 
the administration of criminal justice. 
This proposed model of fourth amendment decision-making 
recognizes a division of responsibility in that the court is prima-
rily responsible for providing uniformity and consistency in the 
soRY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GoALS, PouCE (1973). 
126. K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 113 (1975). 
127. See generally La Fave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" uersll$ "Standardized 
Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REv. 127. 
128. K. DAVIS, supra note 127, at 69-70. 
129. Speaking in the context of resistance to the Vietnam War, one author sug-
gested thst the jury is "a forum more immediately available-and less politically com-
promised-than the ballot box," and thst society may therefore regard the jury as "a 
means for taking an issue back to the public over the heads of public officialdom." Sax, 
Conscience and Anarchy: The Prosecution of War Resistors, 57 YALE REv. 481, 494 
(1968). 
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law; police administrative officials are primarily responsible for 
developing clear rules readily understood by line officers; and 
the jury is primarily concerned with individual justice based on 
particular factual situations. Although there is this division of 
responsibility in the proposed model, there is also considerable 
overlap, since the decision-makers must all address the basic is-
sues of privacy and order in society. I do not perceive such over-
lap as a drawback to the model, rather it is an important benefit 
because it affords an opportunity for formal interaction between 
the decision-makers.13° For instance, the jury could be informed 
of the relevant administrative regulations and court decisions.181 
Such information would not limit the jury's authority but might 
help guide its discretion by acquainting the jury with the general 
principles and rules selected by other decision-makers who have 
considered fundamental questions of privacy and order in soci-
ety. A second example of formal interaction might be in formu-
lating regulations, where police administrators would benefit 
from court decisions that establish clearly defined categories 
identifying what is "settled" law, and what areas permit an exer-
cise of discretion. The police would also benefit from an aware-
ness that juries consistently approve or disapprove of certain 
types of searches. The police could then adjust their regulations 
and actual practices in order to gain jury approval.132 A final ex-
ample would be the benefit to the Court in rendering its deci-
sions from the existence of specific administrative regulations. 
Such regulations free the Court from the highly criticized prac-
tice of writing detailed law enforcement manuals for police.111 
130. See generally Bohannan, The Differing Realms of the Law, 67 AM. ANTHno-
POLOGIST 33 (1965). The anthropologist, Bohannan, refers to the relationships of societal 
and legal morality, and the interaction of courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, 
and citizens as a process of "double institutionalization." 
131. In Maryland the courts have permitted liberal use of materials for the enlight-
enment of the jury. E.g., Dillon v. State, 277 Md. 571, 357 A.2d 360 (1976)(from tho 
legislative preamble to a criminal statute); Brown v. State, 222 Md. 290, 302, 159 A.2d 
844, 850 (1960) (from opinions of the appellate court); Jackson v. State, 180 Md. 658, 
667, 26 A.2d 815, 819 (1942)(reading from legal textbooks). 
132. When juries consistently refuse to convict for certain substantive offenses, 
prosecutors and police often abandon efforts to enforce such laws. See H. KALVEN & H. 
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN Jtffiy 310 (1971)(legislativo change in reaction to jury response). 
133. In United States v. Perry, 449 F.2d 1026, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1971), tho court re-
viewed a police administrative rule and stated: 
We also note that, after this case arose, the Metropolitan Police Depart-
ment put into operation a regulation restricting on- and near-the-scone identi-
fication confrontations to suspects arrested within 60 minutes after the alleged 
offense and in close proximity to the scene. We Bile in this regulation a careful 
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As it has in the death penalty cases, ls. the Court would also ben-
efit from some systematic accounting of juries' determinations of 
reasonable searches. Should juries in the aggregate decide uni-
formly regarding a type of search (e.g., suppression of all wiretap 
evidence), the juries would thereby indicate a prevailing moral 
consensus. 
ill. CONCLUSION 
The division of responsibility and interaction in the pro-
posed fourth amendment decision-making process will not pro-
duce the singular "right" answer regarding the balance of pri-
vacy and order in society. The process is for this reason subject 
to criticism from those who maintain that the process is largely 
irrelevant, and that the ultimate test of any decision is its "cor-
rectness," however one defines correctness.1311 The proposed 
model is based instead on the view that it is at times appropri-
ate for the law to emphasize process rather than to focus on the 
perceived "correctness" of a substantive result.138 One may hope, 
with Professor Fuller, that this emphasis on process as "The In-
ner Morality of Law" will produce a correct decision in terms of 
a greater morality. I believe, however, that it is adequate to rest 
on the realization that, with respect to the clash of privacy and 
order in society, there is "an instinctive apprehension among a 
political people that there is usually much to be said for both 
sides of a question, and that further knowledge may reconcile 
the seemingly incompatibles."137 A fourth amendment decision-
making process that recognizes a role for the judiciary, the exec-
utive, and the people ("represented" by the jury)138 allows our 
and commendable administrative effort to balance the freshness of such a con-
frontation against its inherent suggestiveness, and to balance both factors 
against the need to pick up the trail while fresh if the suspect is not the of-
fender. We see no need for interposing at this time any more rigid time stan-
dard by judicial declaration. 
134. For a discussion of the role of the aggregate decisions of juries in death penalty 
cases, see Schwartz, The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment: A Quest for Balance 
between Legal and Societal Morality, 1 LAw AND PoL'Y Q. 285 (1979). 
135. See, e.g., G. Gn.MORE, THE AGES OF AMEruCAN LAw 110-11 (1977). 
136. See generally A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CoNSENT (1975); L. Fuu.RR, THE 
MORALITY OF LAW {1969). 
137. Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARv. L. REv. 376, 391 (1946)(quoting 
DAMPIER-WHETHAM, A HlsToRY OF SCIENCE 214 {1930)). 
138. Juries are at best an imperfect means of representation. See, J. VAN DYKE. 
Juav SELECTION PROCEDURES 23-44 {1977). Regardless of however imperfectly selected, 
the jury is a means of involving citizens as active participants in the evolution of a 
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society to maintain a formal dialogue on the proper accommoda-
tion of privacy and order. By maintaining that dialogue, we ac-
cord respect to the views of all participants and preserve the 
hope that the dialogue will produce further knowledge and in-
sights which may yet reveal a superior answer. 
proper balance between privacy and order in a democratic society. As such the jury 
stands as a safeguard against a potentially insensitive and insulated judiciary that cur-
rently exercises exclusive control over the determination of reasonable searches. 
